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Abstract 
User profiling using big data raises critical issues regarding personal data and privacy. Until recent-
ly, privacy studies were focused on the control of personal data; due to big data analysis, however, 
new privacy issues have emerged with unidentified implications. This paper identifies and investigates 
privacy threats that stem from data-driven profiling using a multi-level approach: individual, group 
and society, to analyze the privacy implications stemming from the generation of new knowledge used 
for automated predictions and decisions. We also argue that mechanisms are required to protect the 
privacy interests of groups as entities, independently of the interests of their individual members. Fi-
nally, this paper discusses privacy threats resulting from the cumulative effect of big data profiling.  
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1 Introduction  
A growing part of human activities is mediated today by digital services and devices (Kosinski et al., 
2016) and people are continuously generating vast amounts of data by revealing personal data willing-
ly or unwillingly, as they perform everyday online activities such as shopping, communicating with 
family members, paying taxes, reading the news etc. (Mai, 2016). This data can be used to assist users 
in their internet experience, by providing them personalized services (Vemou and Karyda, 2015) but it 
also may be used through business intelligence and analysis tools for opinion mining, e-marketing, 
political e-marketing, social network analysis, eGovernment services, etc. (H. Chen et al., 2012).  
The term “big data” has been used to describe the data sets and analytical techniques that are so large 
and complex that they require advanced and unique data storage, management, analysis, and visualisa-
tion technologies (H. Chen et al., 2012). Volume, Velocity, Variety (Laney, 2001), Veracity (Storey 
and Song, 2017) are key attributes used in literature to describe big data  while some authors refer also 
to the Value of big data which derives from the new knowledge  gained from the applications of ad-
vanced analytics technologies to big data sets (Nguyen et al., 2013; Rubinstein, 2014).    
Βig data analytics is increasingly attracting the interest of the academic world, industry and govern-
ments and personal data has become a raw material of production as a new source of great economic, 
scientific and social value (Tene and Polonetsky, 2012). Businesses focus on acquiring relevant data 
about customers as part of their marketing and sales strategies. Simultaneously, they try to identify 
individuals who may be persuaded to become their new customers and under which conditions (Hilde-
brandt, 2012). Marketing campaigns can achieve an efficient segmentation of the electorate, identify 
targets and communicate effectively. Focus group data, polling and advanced statistical analysis pro-
vide them with critical information they need to create increasingly refined voter segments (Conley, 
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2018). In political or commercial e-marketing, companies, parties or interest groups, are not just 
searching for the attributes of predefined classes of (potential) customers, voters or followers, but they 
invest in finding out which classes they should distinguish in the first place (Hildebrandt, 2012).  
User profiling is one of the more controversial technologies regarding personal data and privacy (Pan-
dit and Lewis, 2018). Until recently, privacy studies were focused mainly on the control of personal 
data. Due to big data analysis, however, new privacy issues have emerged with unidentified implica-
tions: for instance, knowledge about an individual may be revealed even if her/his personal data is pro-
tected (Hildebrandt, 2008a). Furthermore, accurate personality profiles may be constructed by pro-
cessing digital footprints such as Facebook likes for example (Kosinski et al., 2016).  
Hildebrandt, (2012, 2009, 2008b, 2008a, 2006) discusses profiling as pattern recognition and intro-
duces key distinctions between personalised and group profiling. Recently, some authors (Floridi, 
2014; Mittelstadt, 2017; Taylor et al., 2016) argue that profiling and machine learning technologies are 
employed at group level as are used to formulate types, not tokens as they work to scale, enabling their 
users to target collective entities as well as individuals. They also suggest that, since most people are 
not targeted by profiling and machine learning technologies as individuals, but as members of specific 
groups, the privacy of these groups needs to be examined further and considered in the context of data 
protection. Jaquet-Chiffelle (2008), employing the terminology provided by Hildebrandt (2008b),  
conceptualize group profiling as an indirect process of profiling but, new applications of data technol-
ogies are reshaping the definition of targeting. New types of profiling by new applications of data 
technologies cannot be explained from the indirect profiling conception perspective: groups of people 
may be targeted today only by discovering their presence in a particular place at a particular time 
(Taylor, 2017).  
Furthermore, it seems that using profiling technologies for personalization may have long-term effects 
on society, as in the case, for example, of political marketing, where targeted content can make elec-
tions less fair as potential voters are only exposed to specific information (Goodman et al., 2017). Ac-
cording to Baruh and Popescu (2017), ‘..as long as regulatory efforts center on individual privacy lit-
eracy and self-management but fail to recognize the nature of privacy as both a collective value and a 
collective social phenomenon, these efforts are destined to fail’. They also suggest that there is a need 
to consider the collective aspects of privacy, to develop ‘new ways of calculating privacy risks, as well 
as new ways to frame risk information to expand the benchmark used by individual decision-makers.’ 
Addressing this gap, this paper discusses the implications of recent big data-driven forms of profiling 
and identifies new privacy threats that emerge, for individuals, groups and society. Whereas related 
literature explores privacy threats and implications for individuals, this paper extends the scope adopt-
ing a multi-level approach that considers threats and implications for collective entities (groups) and 
society as well. 
The remaining paper is structured as follows: in the following section, we discuss intelligent profiling 
technologies raising new challenges for privacy. Section 3 analyzes privacy risks for individuals, 
groups and society that stem from, these applications, while Section 4 describes privacy implications 
for individuals, groups and society. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion and further re-
search. 
2 Intelligent profiling with big data and new privacy challenges: 
The current landscape  
In the age of big data, the competitive advantage of data collection is no longer dependent on the vol-
ume of data but on the differentiation of information from the noise and the simultaneous retention of 
data that is noise today but can become information tomorrow. This goal is achieved through profiling: 
‘the process of discovering correlations between data in databases that can be used to identify and rep-
resent a human or nonhuman subject (individual or group) and/or the application of profiles (sets of 
correlated data) to individuate and represent a subject or to identify a subject as a member of a group 
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or category (Hildebrandt, 2008b)’. Discovered correlations and patterns may be indicative of expected 
future behaviour. In this context, a profile may be characterized as knowledge that allows to differen-
tiate  the relevant from the irrelevant data (Gutwirth et al., 2012; Hildebrandt, 2009, 2006).  
Big data techniques employ a variety of tools used to discover knowledge in high volume, highly dy-
namic, and highly heterogeneous data. Network analysis, sentiment analysis, trust and reputation man-
agement, machine learning, cluster analysis are some examples of big data techniques which may re-
sult in highly comprehensive user profiles (Hasan et al., 2013). Profiling applications pursue cover a 
wide variety of purposes ranging from anti-terrorism to direct marketing (Schermer, 2011), while the 
of knowledge included in a user profile varies accordingly to the purposes and the domain it is used.  
Schermer (2011), identifies two distinct approaches in the use of data mining for profiling: “descrip-
tive data mining” and “predictive data mining”. While the goal of descriptive data mining is to discov-
er unknown relations between different data objects in a database, the goal of predictive data mining is 
to make a prediction based on patterns that were determined using known information. Related to pro-
filing, this means that information about an individual is mined in order to determine whether she fits 
the previously established profile (Schermer, 2011).  
Similarly, according to Mittelstadt (2017), groupings can occur in two senses: either in the description 
of subjects or actions taken on the basis of probabilities and predictive analytics. For the former, data 
subjects must always be considered along a limited set of dimensions. For predictive analytics, dimen-
sions can also refer to non-descriptive choices, for instance the choice to deliver a certain advertise-
ment due to observations of prior actions. 
Profiling application can facilitate users through providing personalized services and can also be use-
ful in cases such as fraud detection; at the same time however, privacy issues emerge. In the age of big 
data, as Marx (1998), predicted twenty years ago, ‘new technologies have the potential to reveal the 
unseen, unknown, forgotten, or withheld’. In the following we investigate automated profiling for in-
dividuals, groups and communities with big data analysis.  
2.1 Profiling individuals  
Information contained in a user profile can be either provided explicitly by the user or inferred by the 
service that manages the profile. Common information contents of user profiles include: user interests; 
user knowledge, user background and skills; user goals; user behaviour; user individual characteris-
tics; and user context. This content can be considered as private information and it may be harmful for 
a person to reveal it (Hasan et al., 2013). However, in the case of big data analysis, one major new 
challenge for privacy protection is the blurring of boundaries between public and private information: 
‘massive amounts of data are publicly available and can be freely scraped from online platforms and 
environments’ (Kosinski et al., 2016).  
Today, personal knowledge about an individual may be revealed even if her explicitly provided per-
sonal data is protected: digital footprints can be used to infer personal details. Kosinski et al. (2013) 
model of psychological profiling for example, uses Facebook Likes to predict a range of highly sensi-
tive personal attributes including: sexual orientation, intelligence, ethnicity, religious and political 
views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, age, 
and gender.  
As big data techniques can process high volume data from multiple sources user data from different 
sources can be linked and aggregated into a single user profile. User information from different 
sources can also be correlated to validate the information discovered from one source (Hasan et al., 
2013). For example, Buraya et al. (2017), use Twitter and Instagram data to increase the performance 
of personality profiling and Farseev and Chua (2017), integrate data from sensors and multiple social 
media sources.  
In addition, big data techniques can process unstructured as well as structured data. Unstructured data 
of different varieties generated by users is growing in volume with high velocity and contains lots of 
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useful information about the users (Hasan et al., 2013). Farnadi et al. (2018), for example, incorporate 
multiple types of data (e.g. textual, visual and relational content) which users generate on social media 
platforms. Advertisers have recently started assembling shopping profiles of individuals based on 
compilations of publicly available metadata such as the geographic locations of social media posts 
(Ekbia et al., 2015).  
The fact that big data gathering is based on many different sources entails loss of control of their in-
formation for individuals, as in many cases they are not even aware of the processing or cannot trace 
how data are flowing from one system to another (D’Acquisto et al., 2015). 
Predictive algorithms are used by the finance industry for credit scoring and trading and are increas-
ingly rating people in countless aspects of their lives, to  assess whether they are good credit risks, de-
sirable employees, reliable tenants, valuable customers (Provost and Fawcett, 2013). One example of 
using predictive algorithms is the case of self-help health and fitness approaches, such as “Quantified 
Self” and “PatientsLikeMe,” generate data sets that help identify or predict health attributes. When 
these data sets are cross-referenced with traditional health information it is possible to generate a de-
tailed picture about a person’s health, including information the person may never have disclosed to a 
health care provider. By combining the use of these data sets with predictive analytics, big data can 
dramatically increase the amount of related data that may be considered private (Crawford and 
Schultz, 2014). 
Finally, an individual profile may be built by using behavioural biometrics either by extracting profil-
ing information from the measured biometric such as the determination of gender from a person’s 
voice for instance, or by performing identification or verification of the individual and using the per-
son’s identity to link current information to other data related to this person (such as identifying a per-
son’s signature in a financial transaction and using the result of this identification to monitor all of the 
person’s financial transactions together (Yannopoulos et al., 2008). The next generation of biometrics 
includes the measurement. and analysis of new biometric traits, such as behavioural or soft biometrics 
(i.e. biometrics which may change over time, such as gait analysis) and physiological biometrics (in-
cluding heartbeat detection, pheromone detection) (Finn et al., 2013). Simultaneously with their wider 
deployment, use of biometrics raises new privacy and data protection issues.  
2.2 Profiling groups and communities 
Often, big data profiling is employed for identifying target groups. In many cases, group profiling is 
preferable to individual profiling, because it is more cost efficient than considering each individual 
profile (e.g. individuals need to be approached by letter or by phone while groups may be approached 
by an advertisement or a news item) (Custers, 2013). Group profiling is used either to find shared fea-
tures between members of a predefined community or to define categories of individuals sharing some 
properties (Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2008). Group profiles may contain known information (e.g. ‘people who 
smoke live, on average, a few years less than people who do not’). Yet, group profiles may contain 
also new facts (e.g. ‘people living in zip code area 8391 may have a larger than average chance of hav-
ing asthma’) (Custers, 2013). 
Classification and clustering are mainly used to identify groups (Custers, 2013). People are grouped 
together by their qualitative attributes and habits (e.g. “low-income people”, “working class mom”, 
“metro parents”) and predict the future behaviour of these clusters of individuals (Mantelero, 2016). 
Group profiling is also used for political marketing, as segmentation allows a more efficient allocation 
of communication resources and helps campaigns to identify target audiences and then get them out to 
vote (Davidson and Binstock, 2011). Traditionally, voters are grouped on the basis of religion, ethnici-
ty, race, income, education, profession, party identification etc. More recent groupings however, are 
based on combinations of age, ideology, and lifestyle (Russmann, 2016). 
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There is also an increasing demand for a precise identification of social networks communities and 
groups (e.g. members of a family, colleagues, fans of a brand, political groups etc.) coming from brand 
monitoring, business intelligence and e-reputation management (Gadek et al., 2017).  
Xie et al. (2012), identify user communities from folksonomy data, while Abdelsadek et al. (2018), 
approach of social media analytics allows the visual revealing of the community structure and the re-
lated characteristics on Twitter. Also, groups can be identified and classified for recommendation sys-
tems from analysing and processing group photos using metadata embedded in images (the time stamp 
and GPS coordinates of the place  where the photo was taken) (Y.-Y. Chen et al., 2012). 
A group of individuals may also be identified by monitoring activities in SNS and looking for profiles 
that check in at the same location, within the same interval of time and are connected through social 
ties. Group identification can be improved by monitoring at the spatio-temporal features and, in par-
ticular, by comparing the user trajectories (Gasparetti, 2017). The group’s future behaviour may also 
be predicted, through based on patterns of past behavior predictive analytics, while researchers can use 
it to observe the entire population (Spencer, 2015). Finally, group profiling can also be performed 
through surveillance technologies and monitoring technologies such as RFID-enabled travel docu-
ments, unmanned aircraft systems (Finn et al., 2013), GPS technologies included in mobile phones 
(Asakura and Iryo, 2007), CCTV etc.  
Profiling with big data analytics may raise problems that are different from the problems that may be 
raised by forms of statistical profiling. For example, in data mining, depending on the technique that is 
used, every possible relation can be investigated, while, in empirical statistical research, usually only 
causal relationships are considered. The relations found using data mining are not necessarily causal or 
they may be causal without being understood. In this way, the scope of profiles that are discovered 
may be much broader (only a small minority of all statistical relations is directly causal) with unex-
pected profiles in unexpected areas (Custers, 2013).  
Moreover, analytics allows for a new type of group to be formed that is not protected by anti-
discrimination provisions, because the groups need not align with existing protected classes or attrib-
utes (Mittelstadt, 2017). According to Taylor (2017), people may be profiled with big data without 
being personally identified. Therefore, ‘the way that current understandings of privacy and data pro-
tection focus on individual identifiability becomes problematic when the aim of an adversary is not to 
identify individuals, but to locate a group of interest – for example an ethnic minority, a political net-
work or a group engaged in particular economic activities’.  
Concluding, sophisticated applications are capable today to capture, store, use and analyse automati-
cally countless facets of people's lives at individual, group and community level. At the same time, as 
more information on personality, finances, location, relations and online activity is collected and pro-
cessed, protecting privacy is becoming more and more complex and difficult. New technologies and 
their applications bring new challenges for privacy which need to be examined. In the next section we 
address this issue by analysing privacy threats for individuals, groups and society stemming from pro-
filing with big data analysis.  
3 Identifying privacy threats  
Westin (1967), defined the right to privacy as the right ‘to determine how much of their personal in-
formation is disclosed and to whom, how it should be maintained and how disseminated’, arguing that 
privacy operates at the individual, group, and organisational/ institutional level. Then years later, Alt-
man (1977), conceptualized privacy ‘as the selective control of access to the self, involving dialectic, 
optimization, and multimodal processes’, seeing privacy as ‘a boundary control process whereby peo-
ple sometimes make themselves open and accessible to others and sometimes close themselves off 
from others’. Since then, many privacy definitions have been formulated (Smith et al., 2011). Rela-
tively recent privacy conceptualizations analyse privacy focusing on the flow of personal information 
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in terms of access to and control over personal information and many authors use the expression ‘‘in-
formational privacy” (Tavani, 2007).  
However, according to Mai (2016), in the age of big data, the “datafication” of personal information 
shapes a new type of information society hence the issue of privacy has to be approached from differ-
ent perspectives. Through quantification (datafication), data (numbers) and information (text, music, 
movies etc.) are transformed in elements that can be analysed in more sophisticated ways and across 
large data sets for patterns and correlations. Today, most digital devices are connected to the Internet 
and many of people’s daily activities are digitally mediated and connected. In the near future, 
datafication might include “everything”. Therefore, the traditional conceptions of informational priva-
cy are challenged as in the age of big data “controlling personal data” is losing its meaning. Introduc-
ing the datafication model of privacy, Mai (2016), changes the focus from data collection to data pro-
cessing and analysis and argues that privacy in the age of big data concerns about the new insights that 
others can generate based on the already available data. Similarly, Tene and Polonetsky (2012), argue 
that in the age of big data privacy is not only about controlling individual fragments of personal data 
that the individual has an interest to control, but privacy concerns also arise as the information is pro-
duced about individuals as they are sorted and classified for specific purposes.  
Related to group privacy, Mittelstadt (2017), recognizes three types of groups as potential rights-
holders: collectives (labour unions, political groups etc.), ascriptive groups (ethnic groups, patient co-
horts) and Ad hoc groups (examples market segments, profiling groups). In some context collectives 
and ascriptive groups are already legally recognized as legitimate rightsholders. Collective rights in-
clude the right to self-determination held by nations, or legal rights granted to corporations (List and 
Pettit 2011, in Mittelstadt, 2017). Ad hoc groups however, lack both collective identity and agency.  
According to Floridi (2017), profiling is not a descriptive practice, ‘it is a designing one, and it comes 
with the consequence of creating the condition of possibility of the profiled individuals, now constitut-
ed as a group by the very act of profiling, to act as a group in order to claim respect for its own priva-
cy’. Also, Floridi claims that privacy requires a radical re-interpretation in the age of information: ‘a 
re- interpretation is achieved by considering each individual person or group as constituted by his, her 
or its information, and hence by understanding a breach of an individual’s informational privacy as a 
form of aggression towards that individual’s identity’. Considering this perspective, a group right to 
privacy may understood as the right to privacy as a right to immunity from unknown, undesired, or 
unintentional changes in one’s own identity as an informational entity, both actively (because collect-
ing, storing, reproducing, manipulating) and passively (Floridi, 2017). 
Moreover, Barocas and Nissenbaum (2014), (in Taylor, 2017), have pointed out that the use of  big 
data poses new questions to do with privacy on the group level, in contrast to the  individual level on 
which it has traditionally been conceptualized. They point out the difference between single digital 
databases from big data: as the last it is used in aggregated form, where harm is less likely to be 
caused by access to personally identifiable information on individuals and more likely to occur where 
authorities or corporations draw inferences about people on the group level. Their conceptualization of 
the problem suggests that if it is to remain relevant, the idea of privacy must be stretched and reshaped 
to help us think about the group as well as the individual.  
Related research has identified significant new privacy threats stemming from profiling with big data 
analytics, which are related to predictive analytics and to data-driven automated decision-making (Ek-
bia et al., 2015; Mantelero, 2016; Tene and Polonetsky, 2012). In the following we discuss privacy 
threats related to profiling based on big data analysis, extending the scope of current research to in-
clude not only privacy treats and implications for individuals, but also for collective entities (groups of 
individuals) and society.  
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3.1 Threats for individual privacy 
Predictive analytics poses new privacy threats for individuals, as new information, generated by pre-
dictive algorithms is beyond the individuals’ control. Also, when new personal information is pro-
duced, it is not clear who owns this information or has the right to it (Mai, 2016). However, further 
knowledge created about individuals may not necessarily be related to the initial purposes of data col-
lection (Mantelero, 2016).  
Another stream of individual privacy threats related to automated profiling, stem from the accumula-
tion of personal data (incremental effect). Fragments of data regarding an individual user may be 
linked peace by peace until an individual profile is entirely exposed (Tene and Polonetsky, 2012). Ac-
cording to Solove (2005), aggregation (gathering together of information about a person)  can cause 
dignitary harms because of how it unsettles expectations. Aggregation can also lead to power asymme-
tries, as it can increase the power that others have over individuals. Moreover, data compilations may 
be both telling and incomplete. Aggregated data may reveal facets of people’s lives, but the data is 
often reductive and disconnected from the original context in which it was gathered and this leads to 
distortion (Solove, 2005). 
A well- known, but aggravated by big data analysis threat for individual privacy is lack of access and 
exclusion which deepens the information asymmetries (Tene and Polonetsky, 2012). Exclusion reduc-
es accountability on the part of government agencies and businesses that maintain records about indi-
viduals. Harms related to this type of privacy threat are explored by Solove (2005), who, among others 
argues that ‘exclusion it is a harm created by being shut out from participating in the use of one’s per-
sonal data, by not being informed about how that data is used, and by not being able to do anything to 
affect how it is used.’  
Furthermore, personal information of location-based services users may be deduced from temporal 
and spatial dimensions exposing users to several privacy threats. For example, workplace, home, in-
formation about personal preferences, shopping habits, dating habits, driving speeds etc. may be de-
duced (Benoist, 2008). Generally, in Location- Based Services (LBSs), two major categories of threats 
are involved: the release of location information (when the user’s identity is known) and re-
identification through location referring to an adversary’s ability to reduce a user’s degree of anonymi-
ty by considering location information. For instance, by knowing that an anonymous user of a geoso-
cial network was in a given place at a given time, can reveal information such as health problems, af-
filiations, and habits. If the user considers his involvement in the geosocial network to be sensitive, re-
identification is a privacy violation (Vicente et al., 2011).  
Finally, the threat of identification is further aggravated by big data analysis. In some online networks, 
user profiles and relationship data are public, but many users maintain pseudonymous profiles. Nara-
yanan and Shmatikov (2009), show that anonymity is not sufficient for privacy in social networks. 
They developed a generic re-identification algorithm and showed that it can successfully de-
anonymize several thousand users in the anonymous graph of a popular microblogging service (Twit-
ter), using a completely different social network (Flickr) as the source of auxiliary information. Be-
cause it connects people to data, identification attaches informational baggage to people. Identification 
can also inhibit one’s ability to be anonymous or pseudonymous while anonymity and pseudonymity 
protect people from bias based on their identities and enable people to vote, speak, and associate more 
freely by protecting them from the danger of reprisal (Solove, 2005).   
3.2 Privacy threats for collective entities (groups and communities)  
Big data analytics group people together by their qualitative attributes and habits (e.g. low-income 
people, “working class mom”, “metro parents”) and predict the future behaviour of these clusters of 
individuals. According to Hildebrandt (2008a), the identified groups can consist of people that think of 
themselves as a community such as members of an association (collectives and ascriptive groups), but 
they also can consist from people who are not necessarily aware that they belong to it (Ad-hoc 
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groups). The re-identification of groups may be considered a group privacy threat as according to Flo-
ridi (2014), ‘…re- identifiable groups are ipso facto targetable groups’. Also, problems may occur 
from the hundreds of different variables used by big data analysis to infer predictive information about 
groups. In many cases, these variables concern aspects that are not clearly related to the final profiles 
created by analytics (Mantelero, 2016).  
One category of privacy threats stemming from group profiling involves data-driven decision making. 
In this context, the main target of the collective dimension of data processing is not the data subject, 
but the clusters of people created by big data gatherers (Mantelero, 2016). For example, groups may 
be sorted and classified into categories based on their deduced economic and political value (Clarke, 
1999). In the case which predictive data mining is focussed on characteristics such as  ethnicity, gen-
der, religion or sexual preferences, discrimination of groups may occur (Schermer, 2011). When deci-
sions are taken on the basis of this kind of generalization, groups may also be discriminated (Hilde-
brandt, 2008a). Moreover, ‘discrimination might be transferred to new forms of population segments, 
dispersed throughout society and only connected by one or more attributes they have in common. Such 
groups will lack political force to defend their interests and might not even know what is happening’ 
(Custers, 2013). By identifying patterns in the behaviour of groups of individuals and taking decisions 
may also affect the internal dynamics of groups, with consequences for the collective issues of the 
people involved (Mantelero, 2016).  
Further privacy issues for groups are related to location-based services. Ashouri-Talouki et al. (2012), 
differentiate three major privacy issues for groups: the safeguard of the location privacy of each group 
member inside the group (intragroup location privacy), the preservation of the location privacy of each 
group member from anyone outside the group, and the protection of the location privacy of the meet-
ing place in the case of a secret meeting.  
Moreover, there are also privacy issues stemming from being member of a group which may involve 
one or more members of the group, but not necessarily the entire group. In the case of algorithmically 
grouping for instance, as previously mentioned, a group’s members are not necessarily aware that they 
belong to it while the profiles generated by mining other people’s data are often applied to individuals 
whose data match the profile. Therefore, since the implications of profiling for the autonomy of indi-
viduals are not related with their personal data, an individual can be discriminated on the basis of be-
haviours of other people in his group (Hildebrandt, 2012; Taylor et al., 2016).  
Finally, one more category of privacy threats is stemming from surveillance. Because of its inhibitory 
effects, surveillance can be a tool of social control, enhancing the power of social norms, which work 
more effectively when people are being observed by others in the community (Solove, 2005). Surveil-
lance may also violate privacy of association (Finn et al., 2013) while freedom of speech and religion 
are largely collective rights, requiring association for their full expression. According to Fisher, 
(2004), ‘Participation in intermediate associations enhances democracy in a number of ways: it reduc-
es alienation by cementing bonds between people, it trains citizens for democratic participation, and it 
gives them influence over group expression and action, thereby inculcating civic virtue. It also en-
hances popular sovereignty by amplifying the individual voice, joining it to that of the larger group. In 
addition, associations provide a buffer between individuals and the State, and help prevent the State 
from exerting overweening power against individuals’.  
Investigating Facebook as a prototypical example of web 2.0 surveillance Fuchs (2011), refers among 
others to digital inequality, lack of democracy, the attempted manipulation of needs, limitation of the 
freedom to choose and intransparency.  
Concluding, new privacy threats stemming from intelligent profiling are related mainly with the pre-
dictive nature of the generated through big data analysis new knowledge. Also, previously identified 
privacy threats may be aggravated. In addition, we argue that privacy threats may have multilevel di-
mensions. Through the cumulative effect, they may affect beside the individual, groups and society 
leading to complex and various implications which we address in the next section.    
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4 Discussion: Implications for individuals, groups and society   
Traditionally, profiling was based mainly on a few standard variables (e.g. sex, age, family income, 
place of residence) their predictive ability was limited. Today, big data analytics use hundreds of dif-
ferent variables to infer predictive information about people (Mantelero, 2016) giving a high degree of 
complexity and variety to the privacy implications stemming from profiling. A deep and detailed in-
vestigation of this issue is possible by taking into consideration every domain of its application. Due to 
space limitation however, we refer broadly to privacy implications stemming from profiling in the 
commercial, political and security area.  
In a commercial and political marketing context, big data-driven profiling is used to a great extent for 
scoring systems which through predictive algorithms are rating people in countless aspects of their 
lives. Citron and Pasquale (2014), study the implications related to scoring systems and argue that ‘the 
realm of management and business more often features powerful entities who turn individuals into 
ranked and rated objects’. For instance, the case of predicting the pregnancy of a teenager has been 
widely discussed: the retail chain Target’s predictive analytics “guessed” that a customer was pregnant 
and disclosed her name to their marketing department, building personally identifiable information 
about her without collecting it directly (Crawford and Schultz, 2014). Users whose data are being 
mined do not have the means to anticipate what the algorithms will come up with, they do not know 
how they will be categorised or the consequences (Hildebrandt and Gutwirth, 2008). As Tene and Pol-
onetsky (2012) point out, ‘the online company knows the preferences of the transacting individual in-
side and out, perhaps better than the individual knows him or herself’. Yet, the information asymme-
tries between costumers and online companies is ‘like a game of poker where one of the players has 
his hand open and the other keeps his cards close’. 
Nickerson and Rogers (2014), investigate the same issue in a political marketing context where predic-
tive models (behavior scores, support scores, and responsiveness scores) are used to make targeting 
campaign communications more efficient and to support broader campaign strategies. The “products” 
to market in political marketing are policies, ideas, programmes, principles and beliefs (Baines et al., 
2003) and the implications related to targeting citizens aiming to influence them may have long-term 
effects  on society. For example, by targeting users with information that appeals to them, the groups 
established perceptions and beliefs are accentuated. Also, targeted content can make elections less fair 
as potential voters are only exposed to limited information. Moreover, targeted messaging can increase 
the focus on divisive issues as message targeting to the individual concerns of citizens as part of a 
group (Goodman et al., 2017).  
Even more, in areas of limited statehood, political targeting of people may be potentially life-
threatening. In environments where the state lacks the capability and accountability mechanisms nec-
essary to protect against physical and digital privacy violations, identification and association with 
groups facing demographic-based discrimination may result in aggression against both actual and per-
ceived group members (e.g. in the election-related violence in Kenya in 2007–2008, in the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994 and in the conflict in the Central African Republic in 2013–2014) (Kammourieh et 
al., 2017; Taylor, 2017). Moreover, targets of political surveillance are chilled in the exercise of their 
rights to engage in free speech and the free exercise of religion while, suffering actual or potential 
damage to their reputations, they change their behaviour (Fisher, 2004).  
Knowledge- based policing also comes with a number of implications for individuals and groups. Ac-
cording to Leese (2014), in this case, data-driven profiling differs considerably from the traditional 
profiling practices as ’profiling is enacted in a confirmatory or hypothesis-testing way to explore 
whether certain patterns of characteristics are represented in the analysed population data and, if so, to 
put the identified individuals under scrutiny’. Predefined profiles variables may include gender, na-
tionality, religious beliefs raising critique in terms of social sorting or racial profiling. According to  
Tsoukala (2010: 47–48 in Leese, 2014), ‘in risk-based policing, it has been shown that certain societal 
subgroups have been identified as high-risk sections of populations and have been repeatedly discrim-
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inated against for instance, North African youths in French suburbs, football supporters in the UK, or 
Roma people in Italy’.  
In the security and social policies field, big data analysis can lead to a transparency paradox: citizens 
become increasingly transparent to government, while the profiles, algorithms and methods used by 
government organisations are obscure to citizens. This may result a shift in the balance of power be-
tween state and citizen in favour of the former. The secret nature of activities in the field of security 
reinforces this transparency paradox (Broeders et al., 2017). Surveillance in particular, may be per-
formed by governments and it may have profound implications for freedom and democracy. Because 
of its inhibitory effects, surveillance can be a tool of social control (Solove, 2003).  
Generally, big data analysis and profiling may reinforce social stratification by reproducing and rein-
forcing the bias that is present in every dataset as data are extracted through observations, computa-
tions, experiments and record keeping (Broeders et al., 2017). The ‘data cleaning’ process involves 
decisions about what attributes and variables will be used, and which will be ignored (Boyd and Craw-
ford, 2011). Thus, data may be ‘inherently partial, selective and representative’, while the criteria used 
in their capture can distort the results of data analyses (Broeders et al., 2017) raising concerns related 
to the reliability and accuracy of the resulting from big data processing profiles (Boyd and Crawford, 
2011). If uncorrected, the bias that potentially characterises every dataset may lead to discrimination 
and unfair treatment of particular groups in society. When used on a large scale, the results of big data 
analyses may increase social and economic inequalities. Furthermore, through data-driven profiling 
individuals may be judged based correlations and inferences of what they might do, rather than what 
they actually have done. This it is contradictory with the cornerstone of criminal law: the presumption 
of innocence (Broeders et al., 2017). 
5  Conclusions  
Big data analytics are reshaping the digital environment elevating profiling technologies to a higher 
level of performance. The complexity and obscurity of the data processing and the predictive character 
of the inferred from data new knowledge, are some of the new features of profiling which complicate 
and even confuse under some circumstances the privacy implications stemming from it. As Calo 
(2011), argues, privacy harms are characterized ‘by an absence of understanding, a vague discomfort 
punctuated by the occasional act of disruption, unfairness,...’.  
When discussing privacy, there is a tendency of focusing on data collection. This paper argues that in 
contrast with traditionally profiling, one of the biggest changes and challenges related to privacy is 
that protecting personal data it is not sufficient anymore: big data analytics may infer personally iden-
tifying information only by using digital footprints left behind by any user of any digital service. Pro-
filing with big data analysis aggravates existing privacy concerns: e.g. identification of individuals or 
group is much easier now. It also poses new privacy issues, such as the need to shift attention from 
controlling personal data to controlling the new knowledge generated, which in many cases may in-
volve sensitive issues such as health, race, or sexuality. 
But another characteristic of profiling with big data analytics is categorization. Generalization and cat-
egorization raise privacy issues at many levels: we show in this paper that the new forms of profiling 
are focused beside the individual on groups and communities challenging their collective privacy in-
terests. In some cases, such as political marketing for instance, political parties are interested in dis-
covering and targeting groups of potential supporters and voters rather than individuals. According to 
Mantelero (2016), issues related to privacy that arise from this new situation are different from the 
traditional issues of individual privacy and group privacy. ‘We are neither in the presence of forms of 
analysis that involve only individuals, nor in the presence of groups in the traditional sociological 
meaning of the term, given group members’ lack of awareness of themselves as part of a group and the 
lack of interactions among people grouped into various clusters by data gatherers’. 
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However, as  Mittelstadt (2017), argues, advances in data analytics necessitate new controls for the 
privacy interests of ad hoc groups formed by algorithmic classification. Mechanisms are required to 
protect the privacy interests of groups independent of the interests of their individual members. ‘Anti-
discrimination mechanisms built around offline identifiers are thus insufficient to protect groups con-
structed by algorithmic systems from harmful decisions based on attributes that are not merely proxies 
for legally protected attributes (e.g. ethnicity, gender)’.  
Even more,  as Calo (2011)  points out, ‘privacy harm is not merely individual, …but can lead to soci-
etal harms..’. We claim in this work that in particular, profiling for political purposes may have impli-
cations on the society level. Furthermore, we argue that privacy harms may have a cumulative effect 
as privacy implications are taking a high degree of complexity and variety and also extend from indi-
viduals to groups and from groups to the whole society comprising even those individuals and groups 
whose privacy are not threaten directly.  
Finally, this paper has identified and analyzed privacy threats stemming from data-driven profiling at 
three levels: individual, group and society; we show that new privacy threats are related mainly with 
the generation of new knowledge which may be used for automated predictions and decisions. For a 
deeper understanding there is a need to investigate privacy threats and implications in each domain of 
profiling application focusing especially on new knowledge generation. Also, there is a need to exam-
ine privacy from a multilevel perspective as it seems that under specific circumstances, privacy of 
groups need also to be considered in the context of data protection. 
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